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When the Evidence Is the Crime
Holmes v. California Army National Guard, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997).
With its recent decision in Holmes v. California Army National Guard,'
the Ninth Circuit became the fourth federal appeals court to uphold the
military's "don't ask/don't tell" policy.2 In doing so, it closely followed the
reasoning set out by Judge Wilkinson in Thomasson v. Perry' and echoed by
Judge Loken in Richenberg v. Perry:4 Homosexuals are not a suspect class for
purposes of equal protection review; 5 the government has a legitimate interest
in preserving military unit cohesion, 6 an interest that is served by the
prohibition of homosexual conduct;' and dismissal for statements of
homosexuality does not penalize speech, but rather the conduct of which that
speech is probative evidence.8
Taken in the context of the other circuit courts' decisions, Holmes
represents a disturbing trend: the courts' progression toward a more and more
facile dismissal of gay servicemembers' First Amendment arguments. The
1. 124 .3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997).
2. The military's policy on homosexuals is codified at 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). The statute provides
for dismissal of servicemembers who "demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts."
id. § 654(a). This demonstration may be made by engaging in homosexual acts, stating that one is
homosexual or bisexual, or marrying a person of the same biological sex. see id. § 654(bXI )-(3). This
language differs only slightly from the former military policy; the main difference is that the previous
policy was articulated in administrative regulations only and was not codified.
The part of the military's policy that departs in substance from the former policy--he "don't ask"
provision-is contained not in the statute, but in the Defense Department's implementing regulations. See
DOD Directives Nos. 1304.26, 1322.18, 1332.14. 1332.30, and DOD Instruction No. 5505.8. The substance
of these directives is not mandated by the statute. Thus. the "don't ask" prong may be altered or dropped
at the Defense Department's discretion.
3. 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
4. 97 .3d 256 (8th Cir. 1996).
5. See Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1132; Richenberg, 97 F3d at 260 & n.5; Thomasson. 80 F3d at 928.
6. See Holmes, 124 F3d at 1133-34; Richenberg. 97 F.3d at 261-262; 77omasson. 80 F.3d at 928-930.
7. See Holmes, 124 F3d at 1133; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 261-62; Thomasson, 80 F3d at 929.
8. See Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1136; Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 262-63; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931-32; see
also Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1294-96 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the policy does not violate
the First Amendment and remanding on the question of whether it violates the Equal Protection Clause).
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Fourth and Second Circuits, the first to review the policy, devoted a moderate
amount of space to the question of whether the policy's "don't tell" provision
violates the First Amendment. 9 The Richenberg opinion, however, spent only
one paragraph discussing the claim's merits and delegated the responsibility
of a fuller explanation to a handful of cited cases.' 0 The single paragraph
Holmes offers" is even shorter than that in Richenberg, and Holmes cites to
fewer precedents.
Yet it is far from the case that the courts have satisfactorily disposed of
the relevant First Amendment questions. Even if the government's target is not
speech, but the conduct evidenced by that speech, the First Amendment
requires further inquiry-a point that only one of the circuit courts has
articulated in the context of the military's policy. 2 The reviewing court must
ascertain that the government's interest lies only in the nonspeech component
of the speech act.' 3 The Holmes court did not fulfill this constitutional
obligation. Had it done so, it would have found that it is the expressive
element of statements of homosexual orientation, rather than their evidentiary
value, that underlies the government's interest in "don't tell."
I
In Holmes, the Ninth Circuit consolidated two cases on appeal, those of
Lieutenant Richard P. Watson and First Lieutenant Charles Andrew Holmes.
Each man had been discharged from military service after he offered
information about his homosexuality. Each was discharged pursuant to 10
U.S.C. § 654(b)(2), which provides for dismissal of a servicemember who
states that he is gay, "unless there is a further finding ... that the member has
demonstrated that he or she is not a person who engages in, attempts to engage
in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts. '' 4
Both Watson and Holmes attended hearings in which they were afforded the
opportunity to rebut the presumption that they engaged in homosexual conduct.
Instead, they used the hearings to present evidence of their excellent records
of military service. Subsequently, they were discharged.
Watson and Holmes filed complaints alleging that the policy violated their
rights to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment and to freedom of speech
under the First Amendment. The United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington granted summary judgment for the Navy in Watson's
9. See Able, 88 E3d at 1292-96; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 931-34.
10. See Richenberg, 97 F.3d at 263.
11. See Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1136.
12. See Able, 88 F3d at 1295.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 31-33.
14. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2) (1994).
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case.' 5 It reasoned that the prohibition of homosexual conduct was
constitutional 6 and that the discharge was based on likelihood of homosexual
conduct rather than expression of homosexual orientation.' 7 The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, however, granted
summary judgment to Holmes with respect to his equal protection and First
Amendment claims, concluding that § 654(b)(2) punishes speech and status
rather than conduct and is thus a violation of the First Amendment.'
In Holmes, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision pertaining to Holmes
and upheld the decision pertaining to Watson.' 9 Applying rational basis
review, the court rejected the equal protection challenge, finding that the
government had a legitimate state interest (i.e., the maintenance of cohesion
among troops) 20 and that its chosen means were rationally related to that
interest.2' The court rejected the argument that a mere statement of
homosexual status is not rationally related to the interest in prohibiting
homosexual conduct, finding that a declaration of homosexual orientation
indicates a likely propensity toward homosexual conduct.2- The court
disposed of the First Amendment claim on similar grounds: It held that the
"don't ask/don't tell" policy targets not the speech itself, but the conduct of
which the speech is probative evidence, and that the First Amendment is
therefore "not implicated.2 3
II
Many have questioned the application of the speech-as-evidence
framework on the grounds that one cannot infer homosexual conduct from the
words "I am gay."24 This argument does not attack the use of speech as
evidence generally-clearly, oral admissions of guilt may be used as evidence
in court-but denies that a serviceperson's statement of homosexual orientation
has any bearing on whether he or she will violate the military's prohibition on
homosexual conduct. This argument fails largely because of the military's
definition of homosexual conduct, a definition that includes the "propensity"
to engage in homosexual acts. 5 It is a potentially problematic definition; in
15. See Watson v. Perry, 918 F. Supp. 1403 (W.D. Wash. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Holmes. 124 F.3d
1126 (9th Cir. 1997).
16. See id. at 1414.
17. See id. at 1415-16, 1417.
18. See Holmes v. California Army Nat'l Guard, 920 F. Supp. 1510. 1527-28. 1534-36 (N.D. Cal.
1996), rev'd, 124 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 1997).
19. See Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1128.
20. See id. at 1133-34.
21. See id. at 1134-36.
22. See id. at 1135.
23. Id. at 1136.
24. At the judicial level, the most cogent exposition of this argument is Judge Wald's dissent in Steffan
v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting).
25. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15) (1994).
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other (criminal) contexts, the Supreme Court has held it unconstitutional for
the government to penalize someone criminally for her status absent
identifiable criminal acts.26 But as long as homosexual conduct is thus
defined, it seems reasonable to treat a statement of homosexual orientation as
bearing on the likelihood of such conduct.
Nonetheless, accepting that statements of homosexual orientation bear on
the likelihood of homosexual conduct does not mean that the First Amendment
is "not implicated." Wayte v. United States,27 for example-a case cited for
its speech-as-evidence rationale by all three of the other circuit courts that
examined the military's policy2 --addressed the First Amendment in detail.
In Wayte, the government pursued a "passive enforcement" policy in
prosecuting people who failed to register for the Selective Service: It
prosecuted only those who communicated their intention not to register.
Although the Court eventually determined, in part on a speech-as-evidence
basis,29 that this practice was permissible, it did not make this determination
summarily. Instead, it recognized that any government practice that claims to
target the nonspeech aspects of an expressive act must pass the test articulated
in United States v. O'Brien.30 This is equally true in the context of §
654(b)(2). The statement "I am gay" may have nonspeech value as evidence
of conduct, but it clearly has speech value as well, and so the O'Brien test
must be applied.
The premise of the O'Brien test is that "a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.",3' The four-prong test
the Court used to implement this standard contains the requirement that the
governmental interest involved be "unrelated to the suppression of free
expression. 32 At a minimum, then, the government must have an "important
or substantial" interest that would remain even if the combined
speech/nonspeech act were stripped of its expressive elements. In many cases,
this inquiry will be an exercise in judicial imagination, since acts like burning
a draft card (the act at issue in O'Brien) cannot be accomplished without an
expressive component. But a court can still assert, as the O'Brien Court did,
that the government would have an interest in preventing the destruction of a
26. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that the mere status of being a
narcotics addict may not be criminalized); see also Taylor Flynn, Of Communism, Treason, and Addiction:
An Evaluation of Novel Challenges to the Military's Anti-Gay Policy, 80 IOWA L. REV. 979, 1000-01
(1995) (outlining the argument that propensity relates to status, not conduct).
27. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
28. See Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 263 (8th Cir. 1996); Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280,
1295 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 932 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane).
29. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 612 ("Mhe letters written to Selective Service provided strong, perhaps
conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant's intent not to comply-one of the elements of the offense.").
30. 391 U.S. 367 (1968), cited in Wayte, 470 U.S. at 611.
31. Id. at 376 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 377.
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draft card even if this were a wholly noncommunicative act.33 Similarly, in
Wayte, the government would have an interest in the efficient enforcement of
the registration requirement even if refusal to register did not communicate a
point of view.
Would the government have a substantial interest in penalizing expressions
of homosexual orientation if these expressions were stripped of their
communicative element? In other words, would its interest in the evidence
remain if the evidence were not expressive in nature? The answer, of course,
depends largely on what the government's interest in the evidentiary
component is. Because the Hohnes court did not subject § 654(b)(2) to the
O'Brien test, it did not require the government to state its interest in the
evidentiary statements. It is only logical, however, to assume that the
government's interest in responding to evidence of conduct is the same as its
interest in prohibiting the conduct in the first place-an interest the
government has repeatedly defined as the preservation of unit cohesion among
military troops?4 The question then must be: If the statement "I am gay"
were stripped of its expressive, communicative element, would penalizing such
a statement advance the government's interest in preserving unit cohesion?
Both logic and legislative history dictate an answer of no. A propensity to
engage in homosexual acts that is in no way communicated to the unit does
not, and logically cannot, affect the unit's morale. This simple intuition is
confirmed by a glance at the testimony on which Congress relied in enacting
the legislation. The report of the Association of the United States Army, for
example, stated that "[h]eterosexual animosity toward known homosexuals can
cause latent or even overt hostility, resulting in degradation of team or unit
esprit.' '35 General H. Norman Schwartzkopf testified that "the introduction of
an open homosexual into a small unit immediately polarizes that unit."36
General John P. Otjen stated that disruption occurs "when somebody identifies
themselves [sic] as a homosexual."37 These statements show that the
expression of a serviceperson's propensity toward homosexual behavior is
fundamental to the unit disruption such a propensity might cause. Where the
confession is necessary to complete the crime,38 it is more than just evidence.
It is expression.
Framed in this way, § 654(b)(2) clearly fails the third prong of the
O'Brien test. If this section of the statute is to survive a First Amendment
33. See id. at 382 ("For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing clsc, he was
convicted.").
34. See supra text accompanying note 6.
35. H.A.S.C. 103-18, at 337 (emphasis added).
36. S.Hrg. No. 103-845,at 595-96 (statement ofGeneral H. Norman Schwartzkopf) (emphasisadded).
37. S. Hearing No. 103-845, at 780 (statement of Gen. John P. Oijen).
38. The crime analogy is, of course, only an analogy; the statute does not subjcct those with
propensities toward homosexual conduct to criminal sanctions.
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challenge, therefore, it cannot be on the grounds that it is unrelated to the
restriction of free expression.
III
What lessons can be drawn from this conclusion?First, acknowledgingthat
expression of homosexual conduct is key to the asserted harm has ramifications
for other, facially nonspeech sections of the statute. Section 654(b)(1), for
example, flatly prohibits engaging in homosexual acts. Of course, before the
government can penalize such acts, they must be somehow "expressed." This
is not a function of § 654(b)(1) in particular; as a practical matter, any illegal
act must be communicated to others in some way before it can be penalized.
A baseline quantity of expression is thus implicated in all restrictions on
conduct-it is just too clearly "incidental" to require O'Brien analysis. But is
it so clearly incidental in the case of § 654(b)(1)? The above analysis of §
654(b)(2) suggests that the expression of these acts-expression which must
have occurred in order for the inquiry to arise in the first place-may be
necessary not just for the prosecution of the crime, but for the crime itself. If
this is the case, there has been a strange twist: Rather than expression serving
as a proxy for conduct (the government's claim regarding the "don't tell"
provision), conduct in § 654(b)(1) serves as a proxy for expression.
The conclusion that § 654(b)(2) and § 654(b)(1) deliberately restrict
expression, however does not guarantee the unconstitutionality of the military
policy. The government may admit to treating statements of homosexual
orientation (and even homosexual conduct itself) as expressive acts and still
argue that it has a compelling reason to penalize such acts, given their effect
on military cohesion. It might advance some kind of a yelling-"fire"-in-a-
crowded-theater argument;39 it would surely invoke the courts' traditional
deference to the military in all matters,4° including those implicating the First
Amendment. 4' But in doing so, it would face the proper level of scrutiny
demanded by government actions that directly target expression. Moreover it
could no longer promulgate the myth that the military's policy does not have
serious implications for free expression. By uncritically accepting the speech-
as-evidence framework, the Holmes court missed the opportunity to explode
that myth.
-Elizabeth Goitein
39. See 'chenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
40. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981) (noting that judicial deference "is at its
apogee" when reviewing congressional acts that pertain to the military).
41. See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) ("[W]hile members of the military services
are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment, 'the different character of the military community
and of the military mission requires a different application of those protections."' (quoting Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974))).
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Sentencing and the Fifth Amendment
United States v. Mitchell, 122 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed,
No. 97-7541 (U.S. Jan. 13, 1998).
In United States v. Mitchell,' the Third Circuit asked whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies at
sentencing in noncapital cases. Earlier understandings of the privilege held that
upon conviction "criminality ceases; and with the criminality the privilege.",
2
But in Estelle v. Smith, the Supreme Court apparently rejected this established
principle, at least in the context of capital cases, by holding the privilege
applicable to the penalty phase of a capital murder trial.
The Smith Court, however, did not decide the applicability of the Fifth
Amendment at sentencing for noncapital crimes. In Mitchell, the Third Circuit
articulated a theory of the Fifth Amendment that would limit application of the
privilege at sentencing. This Case Note argues that the Mitchell court's
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment provides a significantly improved test
for applying the privilege against self-incrimination in the sentencing context.
I
Amanda Mitchell pled guilty to engaging in a conspiracy to distribute
cocaine, but reserved the right to contest the amount of cocaine she distributed.'
At her sentencing, she provided no evidence and did not testify to rebut proof
that she sold more than five kilograms of cocaine. 5 She was sentenced based on
a determination that she distributed almost thirteen kilograms.6 The district court
1. 122 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, No. 97-7541 (U.S. Jan. 13. 1998).
2. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT CONIMON LAV § 2279, at 481 (John T.
McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961); see also United States v. Romero. 249 F.2d 371. 375 (2d Cir. 1957)
("[Q]nce a witness has been convicted for the transactions in question, he is no longer able to claim the
privilege of the Fifth Amendment and may be compelled to testify.").
3. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
4. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 186. Mitchell's guilty plea was opcn--i.c., not made pursuant to a plea
agreement. See id. Mitchell was able to plead guilty while reserving the right to challenge the amount of
cocaine involved in her offenses because the statutes under which she was convicted do not include the
amount of drugs distributed as an element of the offense. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994) (crminalizing
attempts or conspiracies to distribute controlled substances); id. § 860(a) (criminalizing the distribution of
controlled substances near schools or colleges). The penalties corresponding to particular types and amounts
of drugs are contained in a different section of the Code. See id. § 841.
5. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 187-88. Distributing five or more kilograms of cocaine carries with it a
mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( )(A).
6. See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 188.
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took Mitchell's silence at sentencing into account in making its findings.7
The Third Circuit affirmed, holding Mitchell unprotected by the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination at sentencing! The Mitchell court found
Third Circuit precedent to stand for the proposition that a defendant retains a
Fifth Amendment right with respect to conductfor which she has not yet been
convicted.9 The court distinguished cases from other circuits that appeared to
contradict Mitchell's holding, finding that in most of those cases, "the [already
convicted] witness could have been subject to prosecution for other crimes as
a result of the compelled testimony."' 0 Reasoning that a defendant cannot
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to crimes for which
she has already been incriminated," the court argued that a convicted
defendant no longer enjoys Fifth Amendment protection with respect to the
crime of conviction, although she would still be protected against being forced
to testify about acts of "independent criminality" for which she might be
prosecuted in the future.' 2 In other words, the Third Circuit held, the privilege
"is not implicated by testimony affecting the level of sentence."
'1 3
II
The Third Circuit's "independent criminality" test is in tension with, but
does not run afoul of, the Supreme Court's opinion in Estelle v. Smith. 4 In
holding the privilege against self-incrimination applicable to the penalty phase
of Smith's capital murder trial, the Supreme Court found "no basis to
distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent's capital murder
trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is
7. The district judge told Mitchell, "I held it against you that you didn't come forward today and tell
me that you really only [sold cocaine] a couple of times." Id.
8. See id. at 191.
9. See id. at 190.
10. Id' (emphasis added). In reading precedents from other circuits, the Mitchell court adopted a
functional, pragmatic approach that reconciled those cases with Mitchell by focusing more on their facts
than on their reasoning, on holdings over dicta, and on what the cases actually did, as opposed to what they
claimed to be doing.
11. See id. at 191; see also id. at 189 (citing Supreme Court cases making similar arguments).
12. Id. at 191.
13. Id.
14. 451 U.S. 454 (1981). Mitchell can be read broadly to hold that Fifth Amendment protection ceases
after a defendant has been convicted of the crime about which she is being questioned, or narrowly to hold
only that the privilege does not bar a court from drawing negative inferences from a defendant's silence
at sentencing. A broad reading would focus on certain dicta in Mitchell, such as the Third Circuit's
endorsement of Wigmore's statement that upon conviction, "criminality ceases; and with criminality the
privilege." Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 191 (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2279, at 48 1). A narrow reading
would divide the privilege against self-incrimination into different components, see id. at 189 (listing four
aspects to the privilege), and then restrict Mitchell's holding to the only component actually at issue in the
case: a defendant's right not to be penalized for her silence. The narrow reading is superior because of its
greater consistency with Mitchell's own methodological approach of reading cases as narrowly as possible.
See supra note 10. A narrow reading of Mitchell also avoids unnecessary conflict with Smith.
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concerned."' 5 Although in tension with this holding,16 Mitchell does not
violate any rule laid down by the Supreme Court. The Smith Court rejected the
prosecution's argument that the Fifth Amendment can never apply at
sentencing. But it did not hold that the privilege always applies at sentencing.
The Court instead adopted an exposure-based standard for applying the
privilege: "'[T]he availability of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn
upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the
nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.""..7
Under this standard, the privilege should apply at trial and at capital
sentencing-when a defendant's "exposure" is at its highest-but not
necessarily at noncapital sentencing."
Mitchell raised an issue of first impression for the Third Circuit. After
Mitchell, a split among the circuit courts exists on this question. 9 The
Mitchell court's reexamination of the Fifth Amendment and sentencing may
augur significant change in judicial understandings of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 20 Should the Rehnquist Court take up the issue considered in
Mitchell, the possibility that it might adopt a Mitchell-like understanding of the
privilege, limiting Smith to the death penalty context or to its own unique set
of facts, should not be ruled out.
21
15. Smith, 451 U.S. at 462-63.
16. Interestingly enough, Mitchell does not cite to Smith in its discussion. That the Mitchell court
overlooked a decision as prominent as Smith appears highly unhikely. especially since Mitchell cites to (and
then refutes or distinguishes) other lower court cases that conspicuously rely upon Snth in their reasoning.
See Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 190 (distinguishing Bank One of Cleveland. N-A. vs Abbe. 916 F2d 1067 (6th
Cir. 1990), and refuting United States v. Garcia, 78 F.3d 1457 (10th Cir.). cert. denied. 116 & Ct. 1888
(1996)).
17. Smith, 451 U.S. at 462 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U S. I, 49 (1967)).
18. Declining to apply Smith's holding to noncapital cases like Mitchell finds support in the text of
Smith itself. The language and reasoning of Smith consistently return to the fact that it was a capital case.
See, e.g., id. at 462-63. Indeed, courts have recognized the importance of Smith's status as a death penalty
case, declining to apply its holding in noncapital cases. See. e.g., Baumann v United States. 692 F2d 565.
576 (9th Cir. 1982) ("We believe it appropriate to read Estelle narrowly."). But see United States v. Chitty.
760 F.2d 425, 432 (2d Cir. 1985). Furthermore, Smith itself warns against a broad reading. See Smith, 451
U.S. at 461 (limiting its Fifth Amendment holding to "the circumstances of this case"). id. at 469 n 13 ("Of
course, we do not hold that the same Fifth Amendment concerns are necessarily presented by all types of
interviews and examinations that might be ordered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determination.").
19. Compare Mitchell, 122 F.3d at 191, with Garcia. 78 F3d at 1463-64 (holding that the district court
erred in concluding that the privilege did not protect a defendant during sentencing, but affirming the
sentence under "harmless error" analysis).
20. Under Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court has limited or otherwise modified several rules
of constitutional criminal procedure set forth by earlier Courts. often in ways that have benefited the
prosecution. For discussions of how the Rehnquist Court's criminal justice jurisprudence compares with
that of previous Courts, see, for example, STANLEY H. FRiEDEIBAUM. TuiE RENQUIST COtRI'r IN PtuRstrr
OF JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 127-43 (1994); and Stac, Rosche, Note, How Conservative Is the Rehnquist
Court?, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 2685, 2716-27 (1997).
21. The composition of the Court has changed significantly since Smith Only two members of the
Smith Court, Justice Stevens and Chief Justice Rehnquist. remain on the Court today Mitchell's reasoning
is very similar to that of then-Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Smith. suggesting that he would be
sympathetic to Mitchell's understanding of the Fifth Amendment. See Smith. 451 U S at 475 (Rehnquist.
J., concurring in the judgment) ("I am not convinced that any Fifth Amendment rights were implicated by
Dr. Grigson's examination of respondent.... [Dr. Grigson] only testified concerning the examination after
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Adoption by the Court of Mitchell's view of the privilege would mark a
significant improvement in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. The Mitchell test's
virtue is its vindication of the justice system's interest in accurate and
appropriate sentencing-the handing down of sentences that fit the defendant
and the crime.2 The Mitchell rule satisfies the system's need for relevant
information by treating a defendant's silence at sentencing as another piece of
"information" to be taken into account in the sentencing process.
The critical question the Mitchell rule raises is whether negative inferences
drawn from a defendant's silence at sentencing are reliable enough to satisfy
a defendant's due process right to be sentenced based on accurate
information.23 Although drawing negative inferences from silence at trial is
prohibited, 24 drawing such inferences from silence at sentencing should be
permitted for two reasons. First, inferences drawn from silence at sentencing
will tend to be more reliable than inferences drawn from trial silence. At trial,
a defendant may refrain from taking the stand for reasons unrelated to her guilt
or innocence. Indeed, there are several possible reasons that an innocent
defendant might not want to take the stand at trial: Her prejudicial prior record
might become admissible if she takes the stand; she may have difficulty
respondent stood convicted." (emphasis added)).
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (1994) ("No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States
may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence."); see also United States
v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 635 (1997) (per curiam) (noting that trial judges, in order to craft appropriate
sentences, should possess as much information as possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics).
The systemic interest in sentencing based on a complete record and comprehensive information has
only increased since the institution of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which require courts to consider
a variety of highly specific factors in determining sentences. Under the Guidelines, a district judge is
empowered to conduct a broad inquiry prior to sentencing and "may consider relevant information without
regard to its admissibility... provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support
its probable accuracy." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6AI.3(a) (1997) (emphasis added).
23. Cf. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41 (1948) (holding that sentencing a defendant based
on "materially untrue" assumptions is "inconsistent with due process of law"). This Case Note adopts a
view of the Fifth Amendment privilege centered on the goal of reaching reliable determinations of guilt
or innocence. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONsTrUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 65-71 (1997)
(defending the reliability rationale for the privilege); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 311, 327-33 (1991) (arguing that the privilege,
in addition to preventing abusive interrogation, also protects against erroneous conviction of innocent
defendants). Many courts and commentators, however, understand the privilege to be grounded primarily
in other rationales. See, e.g., Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 415-16 (1966) (arguing
that the privilege's purpose is "to preserv[e] the integrity of the judicial system" and to protect individual
privacy); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusTiCE: AN ETHICAL. STUDY 194 (1988) (identifying the limits
that the privilege places on the exercise of state power against individuals). Those who view rationales
other than reliability as the core justifications for the privilege may find my analysis less persuasive. For
convincing critiques of many traditional justifications for the privilege, see David Dolinko, Is There a
Rationale for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1122-37 (1986); and
Schulhofer, supra, at 316-20.
24. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibiting comment by both the prosecution and
the court on a defendant's silence at trial).
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explaining certain "suspicious transactions or associations"; she may be
"inarticulate, nervous or easily intimidated"; or her vague memory of the
events in question may reduce her credibility in the face of a skilled cross-
examination.25 At sentencing, in contrast, the judge will generally be aware
of any prejudicial prior record of the defendant. (In fact, under the Sentencing
Guidelines, federal courts are required to take a defendant's criminal history
into account at sentencing.)2 The sentencing judge, unlike a jury, will not be
disproportionately influenced by a defendant's poor performance on the
stand;27 as a repeat player in the criminal justice system, the judge has a
better understanding of how the pressures associated with testifying can
sometimes make even a truthful person appear dishonest.2 Furthermore, as
a general matter it is less likely that a defendant will perform badly at
sentencing than at trial. In most cases, 29 a defendant at sentencing is under
less pressure than at trial,30 and she has a greater opportunity to share her
story with the court, unencumbered by the inflexible, unfamiliar rules
governing the trial process. If a defendant remains silent at sentencing, then,
it is eminently reasonable and logical for a court to infer that her fear of
perjuring herself outweighed the strong incentive to testify in mitigation of her
sentence. In short, inferences from silence at sentencing would tend to be
reliable in a way that cannot be said of inferences from silence at trial.3
The second reason for permitting negative inferences to be drawn from
silence at sentencing is that the reliability standard at sentencing is significantly
lower than the standard used at trial. This difference is reflected in the
structures of the two processes. The purpose of trial is to determine whether
the punishment power of the state will be brought to bear upon an individual.
In contrast, the purpose of sentencing is to craft a sentence appropriate for the
crime and the defendant.3 2 In this arguably less weighty determination, 33 the
25. Schulhofer, supra note 23, at 330.
26. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB 1.1(f.
27. Cf. AMAR, supra note 23, at 203 n.21 ("The jury. our innocent defendant might also fear. will
likely overreact to any real or perceived slipup on his part on the stand.").
28. In the federal system and in most states, the sentencing function is performed by a judge rather
than ajury. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1130 (5th
ed. 1996). Several of the comparisons I draw in this discussion rely upon important differences between
the jury's role in determining guilt and the judge's role as sentencer. In the minonty of states where
sentencing is done by a jury rather than a judge, and in bench trials, where a judge discharges both the
sentencing and guilt-determining functions, such judge-jury comparisons lose significance.
29. Death penalty proceedings may be a key exception to this general rule. See infra note?.
30. A defendant at sentencing will likely be under less pressure than she was at ial because the
crucial question of guilt has already been resolved against her. In addition, sentencing proceedings are less
formal than trials and the rules of evidence no longer apply, reducing the likelihood that a wily prosecutor.
"skilled in the artificial rules governing courtrooms, will be able to trip [an honest defendant] up." AMAR.
supra note 23, at 203 n.21.
31. As Akhil Amar argues, "Even if adverse inferences are unreliable to prove guilt, perhaps they may
be reliably used in the sentencing process, after guilt has already been reliably established." Id. at 52.
32. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
33. Because death penalty proceedings involve decisions of such great consequence, defendants at
these proceedings are often accorded protections usually reserved for defendants at tral. as opposed to the
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proceedings are somewhat less formal, 34 evidence that would be inadmissible
at trial may be admitted,35 and the prosecution bears its burden of proof by
a mere preponderance of the evidence.36 These differences in purpose and
structure support the idea that a court can draw reasonable adverse inferences
from a defendant's silence at sentencing that a jury should not make at trial.
Although drawing negative inferences from silence at sentencing advances
sentencing policy goals, it cannot be permitted if it constitutes unconstitutional
coercion under Griffin v. California.37 Current case law suggests that the
Mitchell rule is constitutional. The "coercion" permitted by Mitchell-allowing
sentencing courts to draw negative inferences from silence-is rather weak.
Plea bargains, which threaten to "coerce" admissions of guilt by offering
defendants outcomes more favorable than what they would have received if
convicted after a trial, have been upheld as constitutional. 3' The "acceptance
of responsibility" provision of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 39 which
threatens to "coerce" admissions by offering a sentencing "discount" to
defendants who accept responsibility for a crime, has also been upheld.40 In
light of these precedents, it would seem, a fortiori, that no constitutional
obstacle stands in the way of following Mitchell.
The trial and sentencing processes differ in purpose and structure, and the
constitutional rules that govern the former should not be applied automatically
and unthinkingly to the latter. A defendant facing sentencing has a strong
incentive to offer any truthful testimony with the potential to reduce her
sentence. If she remains silent, it is only logical for the court to infer that she
has no such testimony to offer. Reason and common sense affirm the wisdom
of drawing negative inferences from a defendant's silence at sentencing, and
the Fifth Amendment raises no bar to this practice.
-David B. Lat
reduced protections available to defendants at sentencing. In Smith, for example, the decision about whether
to sentence the defendant to death was made by a jury rather than a judge, and the prosecution bore the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1981). In the
federal system and in two-thirds of the states that have statutes providing for capital punishment, the jury
has final sentencing authority in capital cases. See Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury
Override in Alabama Death Penalty Cases, 46 ALA. L. REv. 5, 9 (1994). Only four states provide for the
capital sentencing decision to be made by a judge acting alone. See id. at 10.
34. Federal sentencing proceedings have become more formal since the Sentencing Guidelines went
into effect in 1987. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3 commentary (1997). Mitchell was
a federal case; thus my analysis focuses on sentencing in the federal system (although the terms of Mitchell
are not limited to federal prosecutions). My argument may apply with greater force in state systems with
discretionary sentencing regimes, which generally exhibit the informality of the pre-1987 federal system.
35. See id. § 6A1.3(a).
36. See id. § 6AI.3 commentary.
37. 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (holding that comment by the prosecution or the court on a defendant's
silence at trial violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination).
38. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (upholding the constitutionality of plea
bargaining).
39. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3EI.I.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 883 F.2d 1010 (lth Cir. 1989) (upholding section 3E1.l of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines against Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges).
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